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Antitrust litigation, spurred by expansive theories of liability and
by the promise of treble damages, has increased enormously during the
past two decades. While most of the expansion has occurred under the
federal antitrust statutes,1 there has also been a significant increase in
both the number and use of state antitrust laws. In 1972 the Maryland
General Assembly enacted House Bill No. 1, which had been introduced
by the Legislative Council, and Maryland joined the ranks of states
which have adopted antitrust legislation. 2 Stating that its "purpose"
is to "complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade
... in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest intrastate
competition," the Maryland Antitrust Act (the Act) proscribes four
general types of conduct:
(1) Any "contract, combination, or conspiracy" which "unrea-
sonably restrain[s] trade or commerce" ;4
(2) Any monopolization or attempt to monopolize "any part of
the trade or commerce within the State" ;5
(3) Several types of price discrimination;8 and
(4) A tie-in or exclusive dealing agreement which may have an
anticompetitive effect.7
This Act is the first comprehensive statutory scheme regulating
anticompetitive business activity in Maryland. Although the Declara-
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1. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1973) (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a),
13(b), 21(a) (1973) (Robinson-Patman Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1973) (Clay-
ton Act).
2. The Maryland Act is codified in M. Com. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-201 to -213
(1975).
3. Id. § 11-202(a) (1).
4. Id. § 11-204(a) (1).
5. Id. § 11- 204(a) (2).
6. Id. §11-204(a) (3)-(5).
7. See id. § 11-204(a) (6).
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tion of Rights to the Maryland Constitution declares that "monopolies
are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government ... and ought
not to be suffered,"' and the common law prohibits some restraints of
trade,' neither has provided an adequate source of protection against
the type of private behavior which now falls under the purview of the
Act.' Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies'1 has limited its effectiveness as a tool for antitrust
enforcement. Likewise, the common law restraint of trade doctrine has
experienced only limited use by private plaintiffs.' In addition, while
the federal antitrust laws have provided some protection against anti-
competitive activity within the state, supplementary state legislation was
desirable for a number of reasons. First, the federal enforcement agen-
cies - the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission -
have neither the manpower nor the interest to police effectively what are
essentially local business practices.' 8 By giving the Attorney General
of Maryland broad power to monitor economic activity within the
state, the Act doses a major gap in antitrust enforcement. Second,
despite the wide scope of the federal antitrust laws, some activity may
still be beyond their reach.' In cases where federal jurisdiction may
be questionable, the Act provides an alternative forum in which such
8. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 41.
9. Compare Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 258 Md. 419, 266 A.2d 1
(1970) (exclusion from trade association not found to violate common law) with
Klingle's Pharmacy v. Sharpe & Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 64 A. 1029 (1906) (group
boycott violated common law). The common law relating to unfair competition also
provided some protection. See, e.g., Edmondson Village Theatre, Inc. v. Einbinder,
208 Md. 38, 116 A.2d 377 (1955).
10. Recent state legislation has also provided some protection against particular
anticompetitive behavior. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 157E(b)-(h) (1975)
(regulating distribution of petroleum products in Maryland). Part of this statute
was held unconstitutional in Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, Equity No. 22,069 (Cir. Ct.
Anne Arundel County, Md.) (Jan. 27, 1976). That case is now under consideration
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
11. The Court of Appeals recently expressed doubt "whether its ban extends to
anything other than monopolies in the strict sense, that is, an exclusive right or privi-
lege granted by the sovereign." Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 258 Md. 419, 424,
266 A.2d 1, 4 (1970). The court, however, left the question unresolved.
12. See note 9 supra.
13. But see American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 954 (1964) (gasoline price war in Smyrna, Georgia, prompting FTC in-
vestigation and complaint); United States v. E.H. Koester Bakery Co., TRADE REG.
REp. (CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.) 1 74,214 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 1972) (defendants
charged with fixing bread prices in Baltimore; consent decree entered).
14. On the reach of federal antitrust law, see Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of
the Rex Hosp., 96 S. Ct. 1848 (1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186 (1974). See also Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine & Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 66 (1963).
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jurisdictional issues can be avoided. Third, the federal laws can only be
enforced in the federal courts or before the Federal Trade Commission.
For those who prefer bringing an action in state courts for tactical or
other reasons, the Maryland Act provides that alternative. 15
This article will outline the provisions of the Act, discuss some of
the problems that it presents, and suggest some lines of analysis. Sec-
tion I explains the substantive provisions of the Act. Section II ex-
amines its scope. Section III analyzes some constitutional problems
that may arise in its application. Section IV discusses the remedies
available to the successful antitrust plaintiff, and the concluding section
focuses on some procedural ramifications inherent in a dual system of
state and federal antitrust law.
I. SUBSTANCE
While the common law roots of antitrust date back hundreds of
years, it was not until the close of the nineteenth century that public
pressure grew strong enough to prompt Congress and a number of state
legislatures to enact general antitrust legislation. By the end of World
War I, however, most of the state statutes were moribund,' and it has
only been in the past ten or fifteen years that these state antitrust laws
have been revived. During this renascence, a number of states have
either adopted broad-based antitrust legislation for the first time or
extensively remodeled existing statutes, reducing to seven the number
of states now lacking general antitrust legislation.17  There is also a
Uniform State Antitrust Act.' 8 Several recently enacted state laws
closely resemble the Maryland Act, and the way in which they are
construed will help identify common problems of application and in-
terpretation.' 9
15. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of state antitrust laws,
see J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 228-34 (1964) ; French,
The Minnesota Antitrust Law, 50 MINN. L. REV. 59, 77-80 (1965), and the authorities
cited therein.
16. Rahl, Towards a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEx. L. REv. 753
(1961). Dean Rahl questioned "whether it would have been unethical in recent years
for lawyers in most states to tell their clients to ignore them." Id.
17. As of this writing only Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont lack monopoly or general restraint or trade statutes. See
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) §§ 30,000 et seq. (compilation of all state statutory provisions).
18. TRADE REaG. REP. (CCH) 1 30,101 (1974) (authored by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
19. Especially the Illinois, Minnesota, and New Jersey statutes. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11 (1970 & Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); MINN. STATS. ANN.
§§ 325, 8011-81 (West Supp. 1974) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56: 9-1 to 9-19 (West Supp.
1975). These statutes, in turn, are similar to the state act suggested by Dean Rahl,
supra note 16, at 779-81. For a discussion of the Illinois act see Committee on Anti-
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Knowledge of federal antitrust law is also essential to a full and
clear understanding of the Maryland Act. Because the Act states that
the General Assembly intended that its construction "be guided by the
interpretation given by the federal courts to the various federal statutes
dealing with the same or similar matters,"2 federal case law will be an
important aid in comprehending the otherwise vague terms of the Act.
21
This principle of "harmonious construction"22 should help minimize
the problem of applying two different sets of substantive rules to the
same business activity. At the same time, the state courts, by retaining
a measure of control over the development of the Act,23 will be free
to experiment with new approaches to antitrust problems in Maryland. 24
A. Restraint of Trade
1. Horizontal Restraints: The Maryland Act begins by condemn-
ing contracts, combinations or conspiracies that "unreasonably restrain
trust Law of the Chicago Bar Ass'n, Commentary on the Illinois Antitrust Act,
reprinted in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1970). A similar state act
is suggested in Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text & Commen-
tary on a Draft Statute, 39 TEX. L. REV. 717 (1961).
20. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-202(a) (2) (1975). While the preamble
mentions a number of federal statutes, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, two
significant pieces of federal antitrust legislation are missing: the Cellar-Kefauver Anti-
Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), and the Robinson-Patman Price-Discrimination
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a), 13(b) and 21(a) (1970). It is not surprising that the
former is omitted because the Maryland Act does not contain a substantive antimerger
provision. The failure to mention the Robinson-Patman Act is puzzling; the preamble
refers to 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970), which is an amendment to Robinson-Patman, and
the Act contains its own version of the Robinson-Patman Act. See §§ 11-204(3)-(5).
This discrepancy may not be particularly significant, however, because the preamble
was not intended to be all-inclusive. See Revisor's Note to § 11-202.
21. For good single volume treatments of federal antitrust law see A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. (1970 ed.); THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955), supplemented in
AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1975); and C. KAYSEN &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959). An excellent casebook treatment is P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1974 ed.). F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1971) provides a useful compilation of economic thought
on antitrust matters.
22. French, supra note 15, at 65. This doctrine was applied in Clairol, Inc. v.
Cosmetics Plus, 130 N.J. Super. 81, 325 A.2d 505 (1974).
23. Federal precedent will not, of course, be binding on the Maryland courts.
The Illinois act makes "harmonious construction" mandatory. See ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 60-11 (Smith-Hurd 1970). But in People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 53 Ill.
2d 332, 338, 291 N.E2d 648, 652 (1973), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this
mandate, on the ground that "the legislative branch . .. [wa]s without authority to
state explicity how the judiciary shall construe a statute."
24. The development of Maryland antitrust law will, of course, be subject to
constitutional limitations. See notes 112 to 123 infra.
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trade or commerce. '2 2 This provision's federal counterpart, section 1
of the Sherman Act, prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade.26 Section 1 has been invoked to prohibit a myriad
of agreements.2 7  Agreements among competitors - termed "hori-
zontal" agreements - declared illegal under section 1, have involved
price fixing (including minimum price," maximum price,29 and price
"stabilization" agreements8 °), boycotts or refusals to deal,3 and terri-
torial allocations.8 2
Allegations asserting improper cooperation among competitors are
likely to be the most common claim under the Maryland Act. 3 Because
of the similarity in language between section 1 of the Sherman Act and
its Maryland counterpart, there should be little substantive difference
in the application of these two laws by the courts.
2. Vertical Restraints: Section 1 of the Sherman Act has also
been applied to so-called "vertical" agreements (agreements among
those in the chain of distribution)," including maximum 5 and mini-
mum8 6 resale price maintenance, territorial3 7 or customer restrictions, 8
and tie-ins.8
9
25. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (1) (1975).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV, 1974) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
27. Although both the Maryland and Sherman Acts speak of a "contract, com-
bination or conspiracy," the terminology has had little, if any, significance under
federal law and the word "agreement" provides a useful shorthand for the statutory
trilogy. Determining whether an agreement has taken place is one of the most
sophisticated of all antitrust problems. See generally Day, New Theories of Agree-
ment and Combinations, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 287 (1973); Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism & Refusals to Deal, 75
HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
28. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
29. E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951).
30. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
31. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
32. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
33. See Rahl, supra note 16, at 771 (1961); Posner, A Statistical Study of
Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 365, 409 (1970).
34. A good introductory treatment of this area is Symposium, Developments in
Distribution: Refusals to Deal, 42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 285 (1973). See also
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger & Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 282, 283-99 (1975).
35. E.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
36. E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
37. E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
38. E.g., id.
39. E.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). For a discussion of
tie-ins, see notes 78 to 84 and accompanying text infra.
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Litigation in the area of vertical restraints has increased enorm-
ously in recent years, stimulated both by an expansion of theories of
liability,4" and by the remarkable growth of franchising as a common
system of distribution. The advent of franchising on a wide scale has
been paralleled by an increase in allegations by franchisees of illegal
behavior on the part of their franchisors.4 ' It seems safe to predict
that a sizable portion of litigation arising under the Maryland Act will
involve such situations. 2
3. The Per Se Rule: One possible difference of significance be-
tween the federal and Maryland laws prohibiting agreements in re-
straint of trade relates to the existence of a per se rule in Maryland.
The federal courts have long recognized the existence of different cate-
gories of conduct in testing the validity of trade restraints, applying a
"rule of reason" in some situations and a "per se rule" in others. The
Supreme Court and commentators have explained the per se rule in a
number of different ways.41 Perhaps the most widely quoted explana-
tion of the rule is Justice Black's:
Although [Sherman Act § 1] is literally all-encompassing, the
courts have construed it as precluding only those contracts or com-
binations which "unreasonably" restrain competition .... How-
ever, there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per
se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which
are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of
everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredi-
bly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related indus-
tries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular re-
straint has been unreasonable - an inquiry so often wholly
fruitless when undertaken.44
40. E.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale price
agreements between newspaper and its distributors held illegal per se).
41. See Bartlett, Practical Problems in Terminating Distributors and Dealers,
42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 317-18 (1973). A leading case is Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
42. The Act also states that it shall not be construed to "repeal by implication"
the State Fair Trade Act (permitting certain resale price maintenance agreements).
MD. CoM. LAW CoDn ANN. § 11-202(b) (2) (ii) (1975). The Maryland Fair Trade
Act has, however, been repealed, effective July 1, 1976. 1976 Md. Laws ch. 243.
43. See A. NEALE, supra note 21, at 27-29, 434-40; Van Cise, The Future of
Per Se in Antitrust, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1173 (1964).
44. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (citations omitted).
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Properly applied, the per se rule serves a useful function; it simpli-
fies trials and lightens the task of courts and enforcement agencies by
banning the presentation of defenses to challenged conduct which the
courts believe will be unpersuasive.4 ' The rule also provides business
with a "bright line" by which to help determine the legality of its
conduct.
4 6
Nevertheless, application of the per se rule has not encountered
universal approval. The use of the rule by the Supreme Court to ban
certain vertical trade restraints, for example, has been widely criti-
cized. 47 Imposition of the rule in other situations has also been attacked
for interfering with what many consider legitimate business practices.48
This criticism of decisions adopting the per se rule might persuade a
state to exclude the per se rule from its antitrust law.49
Such a result may, in fact, have been sought by the Maryland
General Assembly. The preamble to the Act states that it is not to
be construed as condemning acts which are "reasonable" in relation to
the development and preservation of business or which are not injurious
to the public interest.5" Moreover, the substantive provision of the Act
dealing with restraints of trade prohibits only activity which "unreason-
ably" restrains trade or commerce.5" This qualifying language may be
45. "By confining the evidence to facts and excluding the consideration of economic
consequences, per se rules greatly simplify and speed up the process of prosecution."
A. NEALE, supra note 21, at 436. Consideration of the difficulty of evaluating an
economic defense has also played a role in the adoption of a per se rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
46. "Generally recognized as per se illegal . . . are arrangements to fix prices,
boycotts, divisions of market, tying arrangements and monopolistic conduct which is
intended to foreclose competitors from a substantial market." Van Cise, supra note 43,
at 1167 (citations omitted). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
47. E.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale price
agreements held illegal per se). In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that holding the
agreements in question illegal per se was to "substitute blindness for analysis." Id. at
157. See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis
of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975).
48. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division (Parts 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) ; 75 YALE L.J. 377 (1966).
49. Although the Illinois Act, for example, adopts the per se rule for some viola-
tions, it tests vertical restraints by the rule of reason. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 60-3 (Smith-Hurd 1970), and the Chicago Bar Committee Comments accompany-
ing that section. For a discussion of difficulties created by a state's rejection of the
per se rule see Maroney, Antitrust in the Empire State, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 819,
857-64 (1968).
50. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-202(b) (2) (i) (1975).
51. MD. CoM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 11-204(a) (1) (1975). The force of this
textual argument is undermined to some extent by section 11-204(a) (6) of the Act,
which prohibits, inter alia, tying arrangements. Under federal law certain tying
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especially significant in view of the omission of such a modifier in
section 1 of the Sherman Act52 - it is only by judicial construction
that the rule of reason has been applied in federal antitrust litigation. 3
Thus, the addition of the term "unreasonably" may indicate that the
legislature preferred that the courts measure the effect on trade or
commerce of all activity attacked under the Act on a case-by-case basis
in light of its "reasonableness."
There are, however, countervailing considerations. In particular,
the statutory reference to "unreasonable" restraints of trade can also
be viewed as merely restating the general test of reasonableness used
by the federal courts in all antitrust cases. Under the approach of the
federal courts,54 a per se rule is applied to a practice when its "pernici-
ous effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" lead it to be
"conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm ... or the business excuse for
[its] use." 5
Thus, while the Maryland Act condemns only "unreasonable"
activity, some business practices, such as horizontal price fixing among
competitors, may be found by a court to be so inherently anticompeti-
tive as to be unreasonable per se; once the basic facts of the practice
have been established, no further inquiry into the effect or purpose of
the practice is necessary. It would therefore be proper for a Maryland
court to adopt the per se rule following its own determination that a
particular practice was so unreasonable that it should be labeled illegal
per se. Although other resolutions of the per se problem are possible,
such a construction would supply the Act with the benefits associated
with per se categorization, as well as satisfying - at least to the extent
the Maryland and federal classifications coincide - the expressed
legislative desire for "harmonious construction."
agreements are illegal per se. See note 81 infra. Section 11-204(a) (6), which tracks
closely the language of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), does not
contain the term "unreasonable." It is difficult to believe that the legislature wanted
to apply a more rigorous test to tying arrangements than, for example, to horizontal
price fixing.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
53. The rule of reason was read into the Sherman Act by Chief Justice White
in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
54. See A. NEALs, supra note 21, at 27 ("The significance of judicial rulings that
certain restrictions are illegal per se is evidentiary") ; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 72 (1977).
55. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added).
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B. Monopolization and Merger
1. Monopolization: Although the monopoly provision of the Act5"
is nearly identical to section 2 of the Sherman Act,57 harmonious con-
struction in this area may prove difficult. Under the test established by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corporation,5" two
elements must be proven to establish a section 2 offense: "(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historical accident."59 Both parts of this test may
present problems under the Maryland Act. In order to possess "mo-
nopoly power," a defendant must be shown to have "the power to
exclude competition or control prices" in the "market.""0 Thus, it is
necessary to examine the "relevant market" -both product and geo-
graphic - in which the defendant operates."' Although in many situa-
tions the proper geographic market will extend beyond the boundaries
of Maryland, it is not clear whether the Maryland Act would reach
monopolization that extends beyond Maryland. On the one hand, the
Act prohibits the monopolization of "trade or commerce within the
State." 2 On the other hand, the preamble to the Act declares that
"determination of the relevant market . . . may not be limited by the
boundaries of the State [of Maryland] .' 63 These statements can be
reconciled, however, on the ground that a defendant's monopolization
of a larger market - the Mid-Atlantic states, for example - also
constitutes monopolization of trade or commerce "within the State."
If the geographic market is substantially larger than Maryland, how-
ever, use of the Act might conflict with federal law and might even
cause an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. 4
Careful use of the monopolization provision would avoid these prob-
56. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (2) (1975). This article will not
touch on the problems posed by "attempts to monopolize," illegal under both Maryland
and federal law. As to the latter, see Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly
Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MIcH. L. Rv.
375 (1974).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1973).
58. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
59. 384 U.S. at 570-71.
60. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
61. See id. For example, a firm with 90 percent of the sales of a product for
which there are no close substitutes is thought to have monopoly power. See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
62. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (2) (1975).
63. Id. at § 11-202(a) (3).
64. See text accompanying notes 116 to 122 infra.
1976]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lems by leaving the rare problem of large multistate monopolies to
federal law in order to focus state scrutiny on those local activities
most likely to escape notice by the federal enforcement agencies.
Although the second part of the Grinnell test speaks of the "willful
acquisition of... monopoly power,"65 it does not require a showing of
a subjective intent to monopolize; as one commentator has explained
"the offense is either to exploit monopoly power, or to build or main-
tain it by collusion or exclusionary devices .. . ."" Again, the Mary-
land Act may be interpreted differently from the federal statutes, for
the Maryland Act requires that the defendant have the "purpose of ex-
cluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices.""
While the effect of this language is not clear, it suggests that there
must be a showing that the defendant sought to achieve the effects of
excluding competition or controlling prices before liability can be im-
posed. Such a showing would be required, presumably, in order to
ensure that liability is not imposed because of the mere existence of
monopoly power on the part of the defendant. In practice, the require-
ment of such a showing is not likely to be overly burdensome since the
"purpose of excluding competition" may be properly inferred, for ex-
ample, from the acquisition of monopoly power by exclusionary means.
That purpose should not be inferred, however, when the monopoly
power has been acquired through "business acumen" or by "accident."
Such an interpretation would help harmonize state and federal law in
this area.
2. Mergers: One of the major goals of section 2 of the Sherman
Act is preventing a less competitive market structure, a purpose also
served by section 7 of the Clayton Act.68 Originally enacted in 1914,
and strengthened by the Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950,69 section 7 pro-
hibits mergers that "may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly."7 Although the Maryland Act does not include
65. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (emphasis added).
A good short discussion of the Grinnell test is Williamson, Dominant Firms and the
Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1512 (1972).
See also A. NEALE, note 21 supra, at 120-25.
66. A. NEALE, note 21 supra, at 445.
67. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(2) (1975) (emphasis added).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1973).
69. Id. The original section 7 did not prohibit an asset acquisition of a com-
petitor. The Cellar-Kefauver Act was designed, inter alia, to close that loophole.
70. Id. The quoted language has been applied with a vengeance. In United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), for instance, the Supreme Court
invalidated under section 7 a merger between two grocery chains who between them
controlled only 7.5% of the grocery sales in the Los Angeles market.
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a parallel provision, 71 a merger could still be challenged under the Act's
general restraint of trade provision. 72  Experience in other states,
however, suggests that the Maryland Act will have limited utility in
regulating the merger area.78
C. Other Vertical Restrictions
The remaining substantive provisions of the Act follow certain
sections of the Clayton Act, dealing primarily with the relationship
between buyer and seller. Section 11-204(a) (3)-(5) is modeled on
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,7 which was generally
designed to prevent unfair price discrimination. Perhaps no federal
antitrust statute has engendered as much controversy and uncertainty
as has the Robinson-Patman Act.75 Since its enactment the Robinson-
Patman Act has been engulfed in controversy, criticism, and just plain
bad decision-making. 70 Because enactment of a local version merely
71. The Cellar-Kefauver Act is not among the federal statutes listed in § 11-
202(a) (2) of the Act that are to "guide" Maryland courts. However, the Clayton Act,
which contains the original section 7, is included. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-
202(a) (2)(ii) (1975).
72. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (1) (1975). In addition, a merger
might be challenged under section 11-204(a) (2) of the Act as an illegal monopoliza-
tion, or as an illegal attempt to monopolize.
73. Many state statutes lack specific merger provisions. See S. OPPEHEIM & G.
WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 443 (3d ed. 1968). The Maryland General Assem-
bly has recently enacted a statute designed to regulate certain aspects of mergers
through the state security laws. See MD. CoRP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to 908
(Cum. Supp. 1976).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a), 13(b), and 21(a) (1973). There are some differ-
ences between the Maryland and federal versions. For example, employee discounts
are specifically exempted by § 11-204(b) (3) of the Maryland Act, but not from the
federal version. In addition, some of the key provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act
dealing with brokerage fees and buyer inducement of price concessions are missing
from the Maryland statute.
75. The standard works on the Act are C. EDWARDS, THE PRicE DISCRIMINATION
LAW (1959); F. ROWE, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT (1962).
76. E.g., A. NEALE, supra note 21, at 262:
There is a real danger that an account of the case law under the Robinson-Patman
Act will be met with frank disbelief. The idea that a manufacturer may break
the law by granting a wholesaler's discount to a wholesaler who also runs retail
shops, or by selling goods direct to retailers at a price higher than one of his
wholesalers may be charging, or by beating an offer made to an important custo-
mer by a rival manufacturer or even by matching that offer unless he is satisfied
that his rival can justify his low price by cost savings - all this may simply seem
incredible; and not least because the ostensible purpose of the antitrust policy
is to preserve a system of free competitive bargaining.
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exacerbates such problems it is recommended that this portion of the
Act be repealed.
77
The Act's final substantive section 78 is based on section 3 of the
Clayton Act,79 which prohibits certain exclusive dealing or tying
arrangements.8s Under federal antitrust law tying arrangements are
subject to a modified per se rule." Because exclusive dealing arrange-
ments often operate to reduce costs associated with risk and uncer-
tainty, they have been subject to a less rigorous test. 2 The Maryland
Act follows closely the language of Clayton section 3 so Maryland case
law should parallel the existing federal analysis.8 3 A uniform approach
has been made more difficult because of a mislabeling by the Legislature
in section 11-204(b) of the Act that makes certain defenses available
in tie-in and exclusive dealing cases that are not available in similar
cases brought under the comparable federal laws.8 4 These defenses
are normally associated with the Robinson-Patman Act; it is therefore
difficult to conceive of a factual situation in which they would be
relevant to a case involving tie-ins or exclusive dealing arrangements.
II. SCOPE
The Maryland Act, like the federal antitrust laws, regulates a
wide variety of activity. All of the substantive provisions, with one
minor exception, 5 apply where either "commodities or services," or
77. See Rahl, supra note 16, at 773. In fact there is at present a movement afoot
in Congress to either repeal or substantially modify the Robinson-Patman Act itself.
78. MD. COM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 11-204(a) (6) (1975).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1973).
80. A tying arrangement exists when a seller or lessor requires a customer to
purchase or lease a product that he may or may not need in order to get another
product that he wants. See generally Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-ins, The
Single-Product Defense, Exclusive Dealing and Regulated Industries, 60 CAL. L. Rlv.
1557 (1972).
81. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(lessees of patented salt dispensing machines required to buy salt from the lessor).
82. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
83. There is one difference worth mentioning. Section 3 of the Clayton Act only
applies by its terms to the sale of "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or
other commodities," and does not cover agreements involving services, which conse-
quently can only be condemned under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See 35 MD. L.
REv. 725 n.5 (1976) (citing cases). Section 11- 2 04(a) (6), however, covers both
commodities and services. Thus, there will be no need to resort to the Act's general
restraint of trade provision to challenge service tie-ins.
84. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Subsection (b)
was amended in 1975 to correct an even more serious labeling error. See Supplemental
Revisor's Note (Cum. Supp. 1975).
85. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (5) (1975) applies only to a "com-
modity bought for resale." This section is discussed in note 112 infra.
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"trade or commerce" are involved. Because "trade or commerce" is
defined as "includ[ing] all economic activity within the State which
involves or relates to any commodity or service,"86 the Act's potential
coverage of economic activity in Maryland is very broad.
A. Exemptions: The Act contains a long list of express exemp-
tions limiting its coverageY7 One group of exemptions involves activi-
ties regulated by either state or federal agencies, presumably because
they do not require additional regulation under the Act." The Act
properly exempts only those activities subject to the jurisdiction or
supervision of the regulatory agency, thus helping to avoid the frequent
clashes between regulatory agency and antitrust enforcement that have
plagued federal law. Included in this group of exemptions are "public
service" companies, 89 various insurance activities,9" any "person" sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of either the Metropolitan or Washington Metro-
politan Transit Authority,91 regulated state or national banks92 or
savings and loan institutions. 3  Also exempt, presumably under this
theory of concurrent regulation, are designated activities of certain
securities dealers and "registered Securities Exchange [s]."' In addi-
tion, a general exemption is given to any board of trade that has been
designated a "contract market" under federal law.95
A second set of exemptions, drawn from the Clayton Act,9" shields
the "lawful objectives" of first, a labor organization or its members,
or "a collective bargaining agreement between a labor organization
as defined in [the National Labor Relations Act] and an employer or
group of employers which contain those [lawful] objectives" ;917 and,
86. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-201(h) (1975) (emphasis added).
87. The Maryland exemptions are similar to those contained in the Illinois Act,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970). The New Jersey antitrust statute
contains comparable provisions. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56: 9-5 (West Supp. 1975).
88. A similar rationale underlies many of the federal exemptions. See P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 102-14 (1974). A good overview of present federal turmoil in
this field is Handler, Regulation Versus Competition, 44 U. CINN. L. Rxv. 191 (1975).
89. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-203(3) (1975).
90. Id. § 11-203(4).
91. Id. § 11-203(8). The demise of the Metropolitan Transit Authority should
hay no practical effect on the scope of this exemption. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 207(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
92. MD. Com. LAW CODE AN. § 11-203(9) (1975).
93. Id. § 11-203(10).
94. Id. § 11-203(6).
95. Id. § 11-203(7).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
97. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-203(1) (1975). Use of the National Labor
Relations Act definition, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970), may create difficulty by impliedly
excluding from this exemption, for example, governmental collective bargaining agree-
ments. It is likely that the labor exemption will be construed to extend to all other-
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second, an agricultural or horticultural cooperative organization or its
members."8 Finally, the Act exempts a "political subdivision of the
state in furnishing services or commodities,"9 9 nonprofit organizations
"established exclusively for religious or charitable purposes,"100 and
several groups of designated professionals' in "recommending sched-
ules of suggested fees . ..for use solely as guidelines in determining
charges for professional and technical services .... "10'
wise lawful collective bargaining agreements. A short introduction to federal law in
this area is Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Anti-
trust, 89 HARv. L. REV. 904, 914-20 (1976).
98. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-203(2) (1975).
99. Id. § 11-203(12). A related federal exemption is the "state action" doctrine.
See generally Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976). See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96
S. Ct. 3110 (1976); City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 532 F.2d
431 (5th Cir. 1976). In the latter case the Fifth Circuit noted that a municipality is
not "automatically beyond the reach of the federal antitrust laws." Id. at 436.
100. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-203(5) (1975) (emphasis added).
101. The designated group is composed of: attorneys, doctors, architects, engi-
neers, land surveyors, and real estate brokers licensed by the state. Id. § 11-203(11).
102. Id. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that mandatory minimum fee schedules were illegal under the Sherman
Act, but it did not reach the "different question" of the validity of a "purely advisory
fee schedule issued to provide guidelines."
Curiously, suggested fee schedules are the only group activity of professionals
expressly exempted from the Act. It seems most unlikely, however, that this omission
has any significance. The Act, therefore, should not necessarily be read to forbid the
present "ethical" bans on advertising by lawyers and physicians, which might other-
wise be styled trade restraints. See generally Comment, Applying the Sherman Act
to Restrictive Practices of the Legal Profession, 34 MD. L. REV. 571, 584-88 (1974).
The American Bar Association has been sued by the Department of Justice
in an effort to force the Association to modify its model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility to delete the restrictions on advertising by lawyers. This litigation is described
in Justice Department Charges Code Advertising Provisions Violate Federal Anti-
trust Laws, 62 A.B.A.J. 979 (1976). Bates v. Arizona State Bar, prob. juris. noted,
97 S. Ct. 53 (1976), also raises issues with respect to the legality of restricting
advertising by professionals.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975), Chief Justice
Burger commented: "In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is
within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the
State to regulate its professions." Compare Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot,
Inc., 270 Md. 103, 113-14, 311 A.2d 242, 248 (1973) (holding unconstitutional Mary-
land legislation banning advertisement of prescription drug prices) : "Thus, pharmacists
may be distinguished from the other 'professions' discussed above, [e.g., dentistry,
medicine] in that price advertising of retail drugs causes no unfavorable reflection on
the professional aspect of pharmacy by deceiving the public about the type of services
available." In its recent decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), the Supreme Court suggested
that it may be permissible for a state to regulate commercial advertising by profes-
sionals such as physicians and lawyers. Id. at 1831 n.25.
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In addition to activities expressly exempted from coverage, it is
likely that the courts will create additional limitations on coverage,
as the federal courts have done in applying federal law. Support for
such limitations can be drawn from federal and state statutory and
decisional law and from the purposes of the Act itself. An example of
such a limitation is provided by the question whether the Act should
be applied to regulate noncommercial activities. A consumer boycott
of unsafe toys might be categorized as a restraint of trade since it
"involves or relates to any commodity or service," and thus falls with-
in the Act's definition of "trade or commerce.' 10 3 It is unlikely, how-
ever, that a court, applying a statute whose stated "purpose" is to "pro-
tect the public and foster fair and honest intrastate competition,"' 0 4
would consider that purpose to be furthered by the prohibition - or
even the threat of prohibition'0 5 - of a true consumer boycott. 10 6 In
contrast, regulation of ostensibly noncommercial conduct that is never-
theless related to profit-making activity by its sponsors,'0 7 such as a
multiple listing service organized and controlled by a group of real
estate brokers,' would be consistent with that expressed purpose.
103. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-201(h) (1975). The section adds a mean-
ingless requirement that "economic activity" be involved. Id.
104. Id. § 11-202(a).
105. See 84 HARV. L. REv. 1912, 1917 (1971):
[S]ubjecting all combinations [whose activities are not undertaken for profit]
could chill . . . desirable activity. A group may decide not to organize because
of the possible trouble and expense of defending a lawsuit, the threat of liability
for a treble damage award, and the chance that all will go for nought if the activity
is enjoined.
106. This would be true at least to the extent that the restraint attempted to
benefit consumers. For good discussions of this difficult topic, see Bird, Sherman Act
Limitations on Non-Commercial Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247; Coons,
Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 705 (1962);
84 HARV. L. REv. 1912 (1971). See also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359
U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959): "[T]he [Sherman] Act is aimed primarily at combinations
having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organi-
zations . . . which normally have other objectives."
107. The Act comes close to making this test explicit in defining a "service" as
an act "performed ... for the purpose of financial gain." MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 11-201(g) (1975). While this restriction is not included in the definition of "com-
modity," see, id., § 11-201(c), it is difficult to discern a rational basis for distinguish-
ing between commodities and services with respect to noncommercial activities. Thus,
the omission of the profit restriction in the commodity definition should not be taken
to preclude the result suggested in the text.
108. See Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 258 Md. 419, 266 A.2d 1 (1970);
Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Services, Inc., 113 N.J. Super. 371,
273 A.2d 795 (Super. Ct. 1971). Similarly, industry efforts at self-regulation could
be reached under the Maryland Act. See generally Note, Antitrust Problems of Trade
Association Product Safety Standardization, 55 IowA L. REv. 439 (1969).
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B. Real Property: It is not clear whether transactions involving
real property are subject to the Act since they do not fit neatly within
the statutory definition of either a "commodity" or a "service." A
decision excluding such transactions from coverage would significantly
limit the scope and effect of the Act. While the original draft of the
Act included "any kind of real or personal property" in its definition of
"commodity," 109 the reference to real property was deleted from the
version enacted by the General Assembly which limited the definition
of "commodity" to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or any other articles in trade or commerce." 110 Although common
usage makes it difficult to fit transactions relating to real property
within that definition as "merchandise" or "articles," they may fall
within the statutory definition of a "service," defined as "any activity
performed in whole or in part for the purpose of financial gain, and in-
cludes any sale, rental, leasing, or licensing for use."' Since this defi-
nition covers a variety of business transactions, it may be broad enough
to include those involving real property, even though such transactions
are not normally considered "services." Thus, while the activities of
real estate brokers and lessors fit more neatly within the common con-
cept of "service," it is possible to view even the sale of condominiums
by a developer as an "activity performed. . . for financial gain." The
inclusion of these activities within the definition of "service" would en-
sure that all significant business transactions within the state come
within the Act as either a "commodity" or a "service."'1 2 This ex-
109. House Bill No. 1 (first reading). The antitrust statutes of Illinois, ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 60-4 (Smith-Hurd 1970), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.8012
(West Supp. 1974), and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-2(c) (West Supp.
1975), all define "commodity" in this way, as does Dean Rahl's draft statute. See Rahl,
supra note 16, at 775.
110. MD. Com. LAW CoDE ANN. § 11-201(c) (1975). The deletion of express
coverage of real property will not necessarily be accorded substantial weight in inter-
preting the statute. Cf. Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 354 A.2d 817
(1976) (failure of legislature to enact proposed statutes specifically exempting MTA
from coverage of "no-fault" statute did not preclude court from finding such exemp-
tion implicit in the statutory scheme creating the MTA). The present definition of
"commodity" is very similar to the coverage of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1973).
111. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-201(g) (1975).
112. It is difficult to understand why the Act breaks down trade or commerce
into "commodities" and "services." Although a number of state antitrust statutes
make this same distinction, see note 109 supra, it does little to illuminate the scope of
the Act except to make clear that both kinds of transactions are covered. Only one
substantive provision, section 11-204(a) (5), applies to the sale of a "commodity" and
not a "service." Because section 11-204(a) (5), like sections 11-204(a) (3) and (4),
is derived from a portion of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973), which
by its terms applies only to transactions in "commodit[ies]," it is possible that in
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tensive coverage would permit review by state officials of activity that
may be too localized or insignificant to concern federal enforcement
agencies."13 Again, this reading would advance the legislative goal that
the Act "complement the body of federal law . . . in order to protect
the public and foster fair and honest intrastate competition. '"" 4
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
While a -state unquestionably has the power to enact antitrust
legislation in the exercise of its police power, such a statute may
conflict with the Federal Constitution in several ways."' First, if
Congress has reserved to itself an area of regulation - or if Congress
has been designated by the Constitution as the exclusive legislator in
a particular field - a state is without power to enact laws in that area.
However, "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be
deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of per-
suasive reasons - either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has so ordained.""'
While there is general agreement that the federal antitrust statutes
have not preempted the entire field of antitrust regulation," 7 specific
federal statutes may have preempted state regulation in a more limited
fashion. The Federal Communications Act, 18 for example, provides
that approval by the Federal Communications Commission of a con-
solidation of telegraph carriers denies effect to "any law . . . making
[such] consolidations unlawful";"' a state antitrust law could not
attempt, therefore, to invalidate such a consolidation. In addition, the
the redrafting process the term "service" was included in sections 11-204(a) (3) and
(4), but inadvertently omitted from section 11-204 (a) (5).
113. The federal antitrust statutes have occasionally been applied to problems
involving realty. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S. 1 (1959) (lease
of land conditioned on use by lessee of lessor's railroad).
114. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-202(a) (2) (1975).
115. See generally J. FLYNN, supra note 15, at 24-200.
116. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
117. See, e.g., Washington v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wash. 2d 761, 394 P.2d 226
(1964). See generally J. FLYNN, supra note 16, at 109-200. Senator Sherman him-
self stated that the purpose of his act was "to arm the Federal courts within the
limits of their Constitutional power that they may cooperate with the State courts in
checking, curbing, and controlling the most dangerous combinations that now threaten
the business, property, and trade of the people of the United States." 21 CONG. REc.
2457 (1890).
118. 47 U.S.C. §§ 153-609 (1970).
119. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c) (1) (1970). Congress of course may decide to permit state
regulation in an area where it has acted. See, e.g., the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1011-15 (1970) (permitting states to regulate insurance companies). See
generally J. FLYNN, supra note 15, at 38.
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state regulation imposed may conflict with the strong interests of the
federal system in preserving a free and orderly flow of interstate com-
merce. Because most state antitrust acts, including Maryland's, assert
jurisdiction over activities in interstate commerce, there are latent con-
stitutional questions in every state antitrust case.
In determining whether state regulation unduly burdens interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has balanced the needs and interest of
the state in regulating the activity against the possible harm to national
interests resulting from inconsistent and overlapping regulation by the
several states. 12° If a state's antitrust legislation is essentially duplica-
tive of the federal statutes and the nature of the challenged activity is
primarily local in nature, serious constitutional problems are unlikely
to arise. 121 For example, a suit challenging a price-fixing conspiracy
among a group of local merchants would probably encounter few, if
any, constitutional difficulties. If, however, the state attempts to con-
trol activity which would be unduly burdened by inconsistent state
regulation, a different result might be reached.
Thus, of the few successful constitutional challenges to the use
of state antitrust laws on interstate commerce grounds, two - Flood
v. Kuhn122 and Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.1' 3 - involved
attempts to use state law to regulate professional baseball, a sport that
clearly operates on a national level. If those state attempts had suc-
ceeded, professional baseball, and indeed all professional sports, might
have been blanketed by a veritable "crazy quilt of state law,' 124 a re-
sult that could, in the event that a more vital economic activity were
120. See Southern Pac. Ry. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945), where Chief
Justice Stone observed, "reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national
power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved."
121. See generally J. FLYNN, supra note 15, at 80-93; Rahl, supra note 16, at
756-58; French, supra note 15, at 60-63; Note, The Commerce Clause and State
Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1469 (1961). But see AMF Pinspotters,
Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (1961) (Minnesota
antitrust statute held inapplicable to contract entered into outside Minnesota, but
performed in that state).
122. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In that case, professional baseball's "reserve clause"
was held not to violate the Sherman Act. Plaintiff's claims were asserted under both
state and federal antitrust statutes; jurisdiction was obtained over the state claim
on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
123. 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966) (action
against National League owners who permitted the Braves to move to Atlanta).
124. Central Delivery Serv. v. Burch, 355 F. Supp. 954, 960 (D. Md. 1973)
(Thomsen, J.). If the current interest in state antitrust regulation continues, inter-
vention by the Congress or the federal courts may become necessary to avoid this
result. Cf. Barnett, Problems of Compliance - Conflicts in State and Federal Anti-
trust Enforcement, 29 A.B.A. Sect. on Antitrust Law 285 (1965).
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affected, seriously impair the needs of the national economy. Never-
theless, the commerce clause should not prevent vigorous state anti-
trust enforcement in areas where state interests are strong and the
need for a "uniform national rule ' 12 5 is weak.
Another source of potential constitutional problems is raised by
the application of the Act to areas that may affect an individual's per-
sonal rights. Procedural due process problems may arise, for example,
from application of the Act's criminal or civil sanctions. In addition,
rights arising under the first and fourteenth amendments may limit the
use of antitrust laws to proscribe conduct if such proscription would
prevent the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, such as the
right to engage in litigation or to seek legislative action. 126
In sum, while the Maryland Act does not present any explicit
conflict with the United States Constitution, there may be problems
in application. It is to be expected that courts and prosecutors will be
careful to interpret and enforce the Act in a manner that will avoid
these constitutional stumbling blocks.
IV. REMEDIES
The Maryland Act provides successful litigants a full panoply of
remedies - civil and criminal, private and governmental; and, as in
its substantive provisions, the Act has been modeled on the federal
statutes.
A. Criminal Sanctions
Under the Maryland Act a willful violation of the restraint of
trade or monopolization provisions is a misdemeanor.'27 Unfortunately,
the Act does not define a "willful" violation; however, because the Act
uses the term only once, in a section dealing with criminal sanctions,
proof of a subjective intent on the part of the defendant to violate the
Act or, at least, a proper inference of such intent should be a part of a
successful criminal prosecution.128 Because the penalties under the Act
125. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 735 (1949).
126. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961). See also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404
U.S. 508, 514 (1972): "First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation
when they are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute."
127. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-212 (1975). Because an alleged violator
must be jointly prosecuted by the Attorney General and the local state's attorney,
id., § 11-207(b), the latter might conceivably veto any prosecution by refusing to
join the Attorney General.
128. This has been the federal practice. See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PREsi-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CRIME,
AND ITS IMPACT, AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967).
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can be severe,'" it seems unlikely that the General Assembly contem-
plated imposition of harsh penalties on business persons who may have
unwittingly violated the Act. A narrow reading of the term "willful"
might also forestall a due process challenge to a prosecution based on
the vagueness of the Maryland Act. Although due process attacks
on antitrust prosecution predicated on such vagueness have generally
failed, 130 this lack of success has been largely attributable to the cautious
limitation of criminal prosecutions to clearly illegal activities.'' Crimi-
nal actions based on more novel theories of liability may raise serious
due process questions. 18 2
Barring this vagueness problem, the State of Maryland should be
able to successfully prosecute willful violators of the law. 13  Those
convicted face the possibility of stiff penalties: up to six months im-
prisonment and/or a fine of $500,000.'13 The wisdom of making these
penalties available for all antitrust violations is questionable.'"5 Since
many types of antitrust violations can be characterized as acts malum
prohibitum rather than as acts malum in se, it may be unjust to im-
pose a rigorous penalty for acts that are not generally viewed as in-
herently immoral." 6 The discretion given judges in the sentencing
process further exacerbates this problem. While fines and jail sentences
are probably necessary for effective deterrence of antitrust violations,
the legislature may wish to reconsider the severity of the sanctions.1
3 7
129. The sanctions reach a maximum of a $500,000 fine and/or six months im-
prisonment. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-212 (1975).
130. See J. FLYNN, supra note 15, at 44-48.
131. In every federal criminal antitrust action brought before 1969 in which a
defendant received a prison sentence, the offense involved violence, union misconduct
or price fixing. Posner, supra note 33, at 389.
132. Questions of lack of fair warning might also arise if section 11-202(2) (vi),
which states that construction of the Act is to be guided by the interpretation given
by the federal courts to various federal statutes including any "similar act passed
in the future," is used to impose criminal liability for violating such "future" legislation.
133. The Attorney General of Maryland recently accepted a guilty plea in a
criminal case involving a tie-in scheme. State v. Airocar, Inc., Crim. No. 18-898 (Cir.
Ct. of Anne Arundel County, filed Sept. 1976). The Attorney General is prohibited,
however, from prosecuting anyone under federal indictment for "substantially the
same subject matter." MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-207(e) (1) (1975).
134. Id. § 11-212.
135. See Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State & Federal Antitrust Laws, 45
TEX. L. REv. 1301, 1315-23 (1967).
136. It has been suggested that for this reason criminal penalties should only be
imposed in those cases involving conduct which can be "unambigously denominated
bad." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 21, at 256.
137. One change might be to "scale" the punishment, perhaps by making the fine
a percentage of the defendant's net assets or after-tax profits.
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B. Civil Actions
1. Governmental: The Attorney General of Maryland 138 may also
bring civil actions against suspected violators of the antitrust laws.
The Attorney General, in determining whether to initiate action, has
the aid of a potentially powerful investigative device in the "civil in-
vestigative demand" (CID), which allows him to compel the produc-
tion of a document by any person - whether or not a potential
defendant - that he believes to be relevant to the investigation.'89 The
Act provides several safeguards for anyone served with a CID: a
timely petition may be filed to modify or set it aside ;14 the CID may
not "[c]ontain any requirement which would be unreasonable or im-
proper" if part of a summons duces tecum; 1 and the material pro-
duced pursuant to the demand must be kept confidential unless a court
orders otherwise "for good cause shown."'a4 2 In the event a person
served fails to comply with the CID, the Attorney General may petition
for a court order to enforce his demand.143
If the Attorney General believes that his investigation warrants
further action he may seek a written "assurance" that the questioned
practices will be "discontinued.' 1 44 This procedure is appropriate for
138. The General Assembly wisely refrained from creating a local version of the
Federal Trade Commission, thereby avoiding the problems created by two govern-
ment agencies trying to enforce the same statute.
139. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-205(a) (1975). The statutory language
expressly limits the CID to civil actions. An analogous power is granted under federal
law, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1974).
140. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-205(g) (1) (1975). Apparently this pro-
vision only applies to state residents because the petition must be filed "in the court
of the county where the petitioner resides or has his principal place of business." Id.
§ 11- 2 05(g) (3).
141. Id. § 11-205(c) (1). Limited protection is also given material which may
contain trade secrets. See id. § 11-205 (f) (3).
142. Id. § 11-205(f) (1). Unfortunately, the General Assembly failed to specify
what constitutes "good cause." Does a request by a private plaintiff constitute "good
cause"? What is the relationship with the Public Information Act, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 76A, §§ 1-5 (1975)? More importantly, may the Attorney General share the
information obtained by a CID with other enforcement agencies? Given the encourage-
ment to the Attorney General in section 11-208 of the Act to "cooperate" with federal
and state officials, it would seem that he might properly do so. On the other hand, if
the information passed on was later used in a criminal proceeding it would circum-
vent the limitation of CIDs to civil investigations.
143. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-205(h).
144. Id. § 11-206(1). An assurance apparently cannot be used in instances where
violations are merely threatened, for it can be obtained only from "any person engaged
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those cases where the alleged violation is either inadvertent or border-
line and the "defendant" is willing to forego use of the practice if his
voluntary forebearance cannot be used against him later. The Act
provides, therefore, that the assurances "may not be considered... as
an admission of a violation."' 45 If the defendant fails to comply with
the assurance, however, it becomes "prima facie evidence of a viola-
tion."1 '4 The Attorney General may also settle a case by entering into
a consent decree after a complaint has been filed.'1 7  These forms of
settlement are useful because they permit the Attorney General to stop
anticompetitive activities without expending resources on expensive
and lengthy litigation.148
If the Attorney General proceeds to trial in a civil action, a wide
range of equitable relief is available.' 49 He may also request damages
on behalf of the state and its political subdivisions. 5 ° A damage award,
however, must be based on "actual damages"' 5 ' to a "person"' 5 whose
in the act or practice." Id. (emphasis supplied). But cf. Cities Service Co. v. Burch,
29 Md. App. 430, 349 A.2d 279 (1975) (consent decree may be entered even though
there is no finding of a violation).
The Department of Justice has discontinued the analogous federal "pre-filing
procedure," 737 ATRR A-1 (November 4, 1975), citing delay as the main reason for
doing so. Nevertheless, it may still be worth trying at the local level.
145. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-206(c).
146. This apparently means that the Attorney General, at least, can use the failure
to comply as "prima facie evidence of a violation" in a later action seeking application
of sanctions against the violator.
147. The Act contains no express authorization for the Attorney General to obtain
a consent decree by way of settlement. This is unusual since consent decrees have
long been a fixture in federal antitrust enforcement. See P. A EEDA, supra note 21, at
57-62. Their use under the Act, however, should pose no problems, for consent
judgments are in general use in Maryland, MD. R.P., Rule 601 (1971), and there is
reference to a "civil consent judgment or decree" in section 11-210(b) of the Act.
Certainly it is safe to say that a consent decree could be entered into under the Act
by the Attorney General, as Judge Davidson noted in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Burch,
29 Md. App. 430, 349 A.2d 279 (1975).
148. Despite some uncertainty in the language of the Act, the Court of Special
Appeals has held that a consent decree may be entered "without a finding of a viola-
tion of the Act." Cities Service Co. v. Burch, 29 Md. App. 430, 349 A.2d 279 (1975).
Federal law now requires that the Justice Department file a "competitive
impact statement" before a consent decree can be approved, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (Supp.
V, 1975), and the court must determine that the settlement is in "the public interest"
before entering the decree. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (Supp. V, 1975). For a discussion of
the mischief created by these requirements, see Handler, Antitrust - Myth and
Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 211, 239-44 (1975).
149. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(a) (3) (1975).
150. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(b) (5) (1975). The Attorney General
may also sue for damages under federal law. Id.
151. Id. § 11-209(b) (4).
152. Id. § 11-209(b) (1). "Person" is defined to include "[t]he United States, the
State, and any political subdivision organized under the authority of the State .... ." Id.
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business or property has been injured or threatened. 5 ' Thus, Mary-
land courts will probably follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of
similar language in the Clayton Act' and refuse to allow the state
to sue for damages in parens patriae. 155
2. Private: The Maryland Act, like its federal parent, should
prove attractive to private plaintiffs. The Act provides that a private
person who has been "injured" in his "business or property," or merely
"threatened with injury, '"5' may institute a civil action seeking equi-
table relief or treble damages, plus costs and attorney's fees. 157 While
these provisions are standard antitrust remedies, the wisdom of impos-
ing such Draconian remedies upon small businesses is questionable. 58
The Act offers private plaintiffs other advantages. The most im-
portant of these is the prima facie evidence rule, permitting a private
plaintiff to introduce any "judgment or decree rendered in a criminal
proceeding or civil action brought by the Attorney General . . . with
respect to all matters where the judgment or decree would be an estoppel
between the parties to it"' 9 as "prima facie evidence" of a violation in
a subsequent action against that defendant.' The prima facie evidence
153. § 11-209(b) (2). The United States is also permitted to bring suit under the
Maryland Act for treble damages. While perhaps not very important, it is interesting
to note that the United States, when suing as an injured party under federal antitrust
law, is entitled to recover only single damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
155. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 215 (1972). But cf. Burch v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 2085 (D. Md., July 29, 1976) (Maryland Attorney
General can sue in parens patriae for injunctive relief). See generally Handler, supra
note 148, at 248-56. Congress has recently enacted legislation that would permit parens
patriae litigation in certain cases under federal law. Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 2, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
156. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(b) (2) (1975).
157. Id. § 11-209(b)(2)-(4).
158. The Uniform State Antitrust Act only permits treble damage awards in cases
of "flagrant" violations. Approved Draft, Uniform State Antitrust Act § 8(6) (1973).
The Illinois statute similarly limits the availability of treble damage awards. See ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7(2) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
159. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-210(a) (1975).
160. Id. Proof of failure to comply with an assurance of discontinuance entered
into before the filing of a complaint also constitutes "prima facie evidence of a viola-
tion." Id. § 11-206(c) (1975). It is not clear, however, whether third parties can
make use of the prima facie evidence rule in this situation. While the use of the term
"prima facie evidence" in both section 11-206(c) and section 11-210(a) suggests that
it may be available to third parties, there is no specific provision in section 1.1-206 for
such use. Further, an assurance of discontinuance is similar to a consent decree;
failure to comply with a consent decree does not trigger the prima facie rule. In any
event, the prima facie rule will be available to third parties if the Attorney General
obtains a final judgment based on a violation of an assurance of discontinuance.
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rule is borrowed from federal law, 16 1 where it has helped reduce the
expense and length of private litigation. Since the prima facie rule does
not apply to the settlement of a federal case by a consent decree,.
2
the threat of its application after adverse judgment gives the federal
government leverage in forcing settlements by defendants who are eager
to avoid its impact. Similarly, the Maryland Act makes the prima facie
rule unavailable if litigation has been settled by a "civil consent judg-
ment or decree entered before any testimony is taken."' 3
A plaintiff has four years measured from the time the cause of
action "accrues" in which to bring suit. 164 In the case of a "continuing
violation" accrual begins "at the time of the latest violation," ' 5 appar-
ently exposing a defendant to liability for events that occurred many
years in the past. This position not only goes beyond federal law,1
6 6
but also conflicts with the policy underlying statutes of limitations:
that after a reasonable period of time parties subject to possible lia-
bility should be relieved of continued exposure.167 While this policy
can be satisfied if the limitations provision of the Act were viewed as
providing a separate four-year limitations period beginning with each
separate violation in a continuing series it is difficult to reconcile such
a reading with the language of the statute.
In one respect, however, the limitations provisions of the Act are
more restrictive than their federal counterpart. Federal antitrust law
provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations while a government
161. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). See generally Comment, The Use of Government
Judgment in Private Antitrust Litigation: Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral
Estoppel, and Jury Trial, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 338 (1976).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1973).
163. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-210(b) (1975). It can be argued that any
final judgment in a criminal proceeding brings the prima facie evidence rule into
play because the exception quoted in the text speaks only of "civil judgments or
decrees." A guilty plea would, therefore, have prima facie effect, as is the case in
federal antitrust law. General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th
Cir. 1964). The effect of a nolo contendere plea is more uncertain because such a plea
is not viewed as an admission of the charged conduct. McCall v. State, 9 Md. App.
191, 263 A.2d 19 (1970). Thus, it may be contended that a nolo plea should not be
given prima facie effect. Again, this is the position taken by the federal courts. City
of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1964). See generally Handler,
supra note 148, at 244-48.
164. MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(c) (1) (1975).
165. Id. § 11-209(c) (2). What constitutes a "continuing violation" is not clear
because the term is never defined.
166. See generally Wheeler & Jones, The Statute of Limitations for Antitrust
Damages Actions: Four Years or Forty?, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 72 (1973).
167. M. HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 426 (1975). See
also Wheeler & Jones, supra note 166, at 86-90.
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antitrust suit is pending. 68 A prospective plaintiff is thus able to await
the outcome of the government's case before bringing his own action,
thereby helping to avoid duplicative litigation. The Maryland Act,
however, does not contain a similar tolling provision.
One possible obstacle to a successful private action may be the
language in the preamble to the Act which states that the General
Assembly intended that the Act not be used to prohibit activity that is
"reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business
or which [is] not injurious to the public interest."' 6 A private plain-
tiff might be severely handicapped if he were required to show injury
to the public as well as himself in order to maintain his cause of action.
Such a restriction is, however, unlikely to be imposed for two reasons.
First, the "public injury" language is part of a clause that also recog-
nizes the state's interest in developing and preserving business, an end
served by encouraging private actions. Second, the substantive pro-
vision authorizing private causes of action only requires proof of an
injury or threat of injury to the plaintiff's "business or property";
no mention is made of a need to show an injury to the public at large.Y
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Antitrust litigation is -notorious for its length and complexity.
Uncertain substantive law, difficult factual settings, and the high re-
wards available to successful plaintiffs enhance the importance of
procedural maneuvering. The battle of the courtroom or settlement
table is often heavily influenced by the result of procedural scrimmages.
One of the most obvious procedural conflicts will arise when a plaintiff
joins federal and state antitrust claims in one action.' 7 ' An attempted
joinder of such claims in state court is unlikely to succeed, however,
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in General Investment Co. v.
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 72 which held that
state courts lacked the power to grant equitable relief under the federal
antitrust laws because those statutes explicitly state that equitable
relief can be sought only in federal court.17  The General Investment
168. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1973).
169. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-202(b) (2) (i) (1975).
170. Such a requirement was once part of federal law, but it was finally eliminated
in Radiant Burners v. People's Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
171. See MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(b) (2) (1975).
172. 260 U.S. 261 (1922). This doctrine was originally stated in Bluenstock Bros.
Advertising v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 36 (1920).
173. 260 U.S. at 287. This holding is something of an anomaly in that state courts
generally have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to enforce federally created
rights, at least where Congress has not made federal jurisdiction exclusive. P. BATOR,
1976]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
doctrine was subsequently expanded to the extent that state courts
now have no original jurisdiction over any federal antitrust ac-
tions - equitable or legal. 74 On the other hand, where a plaintiff
joins state and federal claims in a federal court, the federal court will
probably retain jurisdiction over the state claim, either on the basis of
diversity of citizenship' 75 or pendent jurisdiction.'76
In the event both federal and state forums are available to the
plaintiff, the choice between the two is not likely to turn on procedural
differences since there are few significant differences between the Mary-
land and Federal Rules of Procedure. 17 7 Because of the more stringent
notice requirements imposed by the federal courts with respect to class
actions,178 however, the state courts might become a haven for anti-
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 434-38 (2d ed. 1973); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 171-74 (2d ed. 1970). The federal jurisdictional statute dealing with
antitrust matters, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), does not use the term "exclusive," but
only gives federal district courts "original" jurisdiction over antitrust matters; it is
at least arguable, therefore, that the General Investment case was decided incorrectly.
174. Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654
(9th Cir. 1972). For an interesting example of a state court permitting a defense
based on the federal antitrust laws to be raised in an action grounded on state contract
law, see Cunningham v. A.S. Abell Co., 264 Md. 649, 288 A.2d 157 (1972).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
176. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 173, at 62-65. The strain on federal-
state relations created when a federal court decides unresolved issues of state law
should be minimized by the provision in the Maryland Act mandating "harmonious
construction." See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra. If an antitrust plaintiff
fails in state court, he is likely to have little success in a subsequent federal action
if his claim is based on substantially the same facts as the original state action, even
though he sues under different statutory provisions. Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co.,
327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964).
An interesting question might arise if a plaintiff seeks treble damages for the
same violation under both federal and state law. While actual damages may, presum-
ably, be recovered only once, both federal and state law permit recovery of extra,
two-fold damages as a type of penalty. A court would probably not permit damages
to be parlayed in this fashion on the theory that the treble damage award represents
the limit of authorization for "punitive" measures.
177. One possible difference is that while an unlimited number of interrogatories
may be served on an opposing party under the Federal Rules, Maryland Rule 417(a) (2)
imposes a limit on the number that can be served without court approval. Given the
complex factual problems inherent in antitrust litigation, this may prove to be a
significant difference.
178. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Maryland has
not yet made such notice requirements mandatory, although the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals in Johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26 Md. App. 122, 337 A.2d 210
(1975), did, in dicta, adopt much of the holding in Eisen. MD. R.P. 209(c) (1971)
allows a court the discretion in class actions to impose notice requirements if it feels
they are necessary to protect class members.
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trust class actions.179 Such a development might jeopardize the present
status of class actions in Maryland and cause restrictions to be imposed
similar to those that have been adopted at the federal level.
CONCLUSION
From Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote that "the Sher-
man Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompe-
tence,"'' s0 to John Kenneth Galbraith, who said that "the antitrust
laws, if they worked as their proponents hope, will only make matters
worse,"' 181 eminent jurists and economists have questioned the premises
of our antitrust policy. Nevertheless, antitrust is certainly here to stay
and state antitrust legislation can benefit the citizens of the state. In
particular, the Maryland Act allows the Attorney General the oppor-
tunity to monitor anticompetitive business conduct that is primarily
local in scope and therefore likely to escape scrutiny by federal enforce-
ment officials. Additionally, the Act provides a state forum for private
antitrust plaintiffs who are unable or unwilling to bring an action
under federal law. Unfortunately, the Act, as it emerged from the
General Assembly, was not well drafted and the ambiguity of some of
the language engenders needless uncertainty and confusion. The Gen-
eral Assembly may wish to correct these defects.
The Act has as yet seen little use. In its first four years no private
actions have been brought under it, and the Attorney General's office" 2
has used the Act only sparingly. 18 3 Antitrust litigation is laborious
and expensive, and effective use of the Act by the Attorney General will
require a substantial financial commitment.' If adequate funding is
179. Cf. Clark v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 674 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-35 Cir. Ct. of Wayne City, Mich., July 15, 1974 (certifying class action,
after Eisen, brought by single registered car owners seeking one hundred million
dollars in damages).
180. 1 HOLMEs-PoLLOCK LETTERS 163 (1941) (letter of April 23, 1910).
181. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 216 (1973).
182. There are three Assistant Attorneys General working primarily on antitrust
matters. Their responsibilities include litigation under federal antitrust laws as well
as under the state act. As of December 1, 1976, The Attorney General's office has
recovered $1,072,825.40 in litigation brought under the federal laws.
183. The only reported decision is Cities Service Oil Co. v. Burch, 29 Md. App.
430, 349 A.2d 279 (1975), involving a consent decree entered into with a tire dis-
tributor. The only criminal proceeding to date is State v. Airocar, Inc., Crim. No.
18-898 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, filed Sept. 1976), which resulted in a guilty
plea to two counts of operating an illegal tie-in arrangement. The Attorney General's
Office obtained a Final Judgment and Consent Decree in Burch v. Berk, Equity No.
21-599 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, filed Aug. 30, 1973) and an Assurance of
Discontinuance from Barbers' Local Union 223 ef al. (approved April, 1974).
184. Several states have attempted to overcome the financial problem by returning
a percentage of damages recovered in state antitrust litigation to the Attorney
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not forthcoming, the Act will simply add needless complexity to busi-
ness life in the 'state. If the necessary financial investment is made,
however, and the courts and the Attorney General bear in mind that
the purpose of the Act is to promote competition within the state, the
Maryland antitrust experience can be a good one. 85
General's Office to fund further enforcement. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 16750
(West Supp. 1975); Onio REv. CoDE ANN. § 13.109.82 (Anderson 1967).
185. An additional benefit of the Act might arise if familiarity with antitrust law
encourages Maryland courts to apply antitrust principles in more traditional case
settings. A fertile field for this approach is that of restrictive covenants in shopping
center leases, sale of businesses, or employment agreements. See generally Goldshmid,
Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants
Under Federal Law, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 1193 (1973); Note, The Antitrust Implications
of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1201 (1973).
As these authorities demonstrate, restrictive covenants can be challenged under the
antitrust laws. In fact, Professor Posner found this area to be the most fertile source
of private state antitrust litigation. Posner, supra note 33, at 409, Table 33.
